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NOTES
TITLE VII AND THE PREGNANT EMPLOYEE
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it an unlawful employment
practice for an employer to discriminate with respect to policies concerning hir-
ing, discharging, compensation and terms and conditions of employment be-
cause of an individual's sex.1 The Act, however, does provide that it shall not
be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire or classify an in-
dividual because of sex where sex is a "bona fide occupational qualification"
reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business.2 The
purpose of this note is to explore the meaning of "bona fide occupational quali-
fication" (BFOQ) as applied to pregnant employees and discuss the interpre-
tations given to this qualification by the courts and administrative agencies.
This note will also discuss protection against employment discrimination afforded
by Title VII and by the fourteenth amendment.
I. Brief History of Discrimination of Female Employees
A. Before Title VII
The issue of equal employment opportunities for women is not new; yet
the right of women to nondiscrimination in employment is a concept only re-
cently given effect by the courts. In 1908 the Supreme Court held that a state
protective law limiting female employees to ten-hour workdays was justified by
the "inherent difference between the sexes, and in the different functions in life
which they perform."'  This policy of upholding state protective legislation
which, inter alia, limited the number of hours a woman could work in one day,
was rejected by the Supreme Court in 1923 in Adkins v. Children's Hospital,4
where the District of Columbia's minimum wage law for women was declared
invalid. This rejection of discriminatory legislation by the Court was short-lived.
In 1937 Adkins was overruled when a Washington minimum wage and working
conditions law was upheld.5 Following this decision, this type of state protective
law was not held unconstitutional by the Court until the mid-1960's.
1 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1964), as amended 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2 (1972).
2 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (e) (1964). Nowhere in Title VII is there a definition of "bona
fide occupational qualification." In only one committee report filed concerning Title VII [H.R.
REP. No. 914, U.S. CODE CONG. AND AD. NEws, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 2391 (1964)] is the
BFOQ clause mentioned, and it merely states that the BFOQ is a "very limited exception"
and shall be applied in only "rare situations." (at 2403). An interpretative memorandum was
submitted to the Senate [110 CONG. REc. 7212 (1964)], which provides some examples of a
BFOQ:
.. . the preference of a French restaurant for a French cook, the preference of a
professional baseball team for male players, and the preference of a business which
seeks the patronage of members of particular religious groups for a salesman of that
religion.
Id. at 7213. With only this sparse legislative history as a guide, it is no wonder that there has
been great difficulty in interpreting the meaning of BFOQ.
3 Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 423 (1908).
4 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
5 West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
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B. Title VIi's Impact
Title VII made it unlawful for employers6 to engage in discriminatory em-
ployment practices. The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972,' amend-
ing Title VII, extended coverage to state and local government employees
and the employees of educational institutions. Federal employees, although not
within the ambit of protection of Title VII, are entitled to nondiscriminatory
employment practices pursuant to Executive Order No. 11478.' This order,
among other things, delineates the federal policy of protecting women from
employment discrimination. The vast majority of working women, therefore,
are protected from employment discrimination by either Title VII, as amended,
or by executive order.
This protection against discrimination for women is not all-encompassing.
The existence of bona fide occupational qualifications allows a certain degree of
sexist discrimination. A BFOQ based on sex exists where due to the inherent
requirements and necessities of a particular job discrimination is necessary to
prevent an unduly burdensome business situation. Where such a situation is
present, the BFOQ clause of Title VII permits lawful discrimination.9 In effect,
this clause creates an internal contradiction within Title VII, as one author
aptly states: "Theoretically, the BFOQ provision is absolutely contradictory to
the anti-discrimination provision of Title VII because it allows persons to be
evaluated according to their class status rather than their individual ca-
pabilities.""
In order to minimize the counterproductive effect of the BFOQ provision,
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), empowered by Title
VII," has issued guidelines concerning the BFOQ as applied to women. 2 In
1972 the EEOC promulgated specific guidelines concerning pregnant em-
ployees:'"
6 The term "employer" means a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce
who has twenty-five or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or
more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such
a person, but such term does not include (1) the United States, a corporation wholly
owned by the Government of the United States, an Indian tribe, or a State or political
subdivision thereof, (2) a bona fide private membership club (other than a labor
organization) which is exempt from taxation under section 501 (c) of Title 26: ....
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1964).
7 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e(b), 2000e-1 (1972) amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(b), 2000e-1
(1964). .
8 3 C.F... 133 (Comp. 1969), superseding Exec. Order No. 11246, as amended Exec.
Order No. 11375, 3 C.F.R. 402 (1970).
9 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2e (1964).
10 Shaman, Toward Defining and Abolishing the Bona Fide Occupational Qualification
Based on Class Status, 22 LAB. L.J. 332, 333 (1971).
11 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-4, 12 (1964), as amended 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-4 (1972).
§ 2000e-12.(a) The Commission shall have the authority from time to time to issue, amend,
or rescind suitable procedural regulations to carry out the provisions of this sub-
chapter ....
12 29 C.F.R. § 1604 (1972). The EEOC Guidelines On Discrimination Because of Sex,
in general, delineate the Commission's position on various employment practices in regard to
sex discrimination. Examples of what policies are discriminatory, such as assumptions of the
comparative employment characteristics of women in general, are given and the premise that
all employees, male or female, are to be treated as individuals and not classified by sex is
dearly established.
13 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10 (1972).
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Sec. 1604.10 Employment Policies Relating to Pregnancy and Childbirth.
(a) A written or unwritten policy or practice which excludes from employ-
ment applicants or employees because of pregnancy is in prima facie violation
of Title VII.
(b) Disabilities caused or contributed to by pregnancy, miscarriage, abortion,
childbirth, and recovery therefrom are, for all job-related purposes, tempo-
rary disabilities and should be treated as such under any health or temporary
disability insurance or sick leave plan available in connection with employ-
ment. Written and unwritten employment policies and practices involving
matters such as the commencement and duration of leave, the availability
of extensions, the accrual of seniority and other benefits and privileges, re-
instatement, and payment under any health or temporary disability insurance
sick leave plan, formal or informal, shall be applied to disability due to
pregnancy or childbirth on the same terms and conditions as they are ap-
plied to other temporary disabilities.
(c) Where the termination of an employee who is temporarily disabled is
caused by an employment policy under which insufficient or no leave is avail-
able, such a termination violates the Act if it has a disparate impact on
employees of one sex and is not justified by business necessity.
The mandate of Title VII, as refined by the EEOC guidelines, is that an em-
ployee is to be treated as an individual and not as a stereotype representative of
a class.1"
The EEOC is not the only federal agency promulgating sex discrimination
guidelines. The Office of Federal Contract Compliance (OFCC), in further-
ance of Executive Order 11246,"5 has issued guidelines which are applicable
to all contracting agencies of the Government and to contractors and subcon-
tractors performing under Government contracts.1" These guidelines require
childbearing to be treated as a short-term disability justifying a leave of absence.'
In general, no discrimination is allowed unless sex is a bona fide occupational
qualification.' s The guidelines go on to state: "In most Government contract
work there are only very limited instances where valid reasons can be expected
to exist which would justify the exclusion of all men or all women from any
given job."' 9
The language and treatment of sex discrimination by the EEOC and the
OFCC are similar and help to establish a common denominator in dealing with
interpretations of administrative rulings. Although such interpretations do not
have the force of law, the courts show "great deference to the interpretation
given the statute by the officers or agency charged with its administration '"
and may even accept guidelines as issued by an administrative agency in total.2"
The judicial system has also declared certain employment practices viola-
tive of the spirit and letter of Title VII. In many cases arising under Title VII
14 See Comment, The Mandate Of Title VII Of The Civil Rights Act Of 1964: To Treat
Women As Individuals, 59 GEO. L.J. 221, 223 (1970).
15 Exec. Order No. 11246, 3 C.F.R. 167 (Supp. 1965).
16 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.1 et seq. (1972).
17 41 C.F.R. § 60-20.3(g) (1973).
18 41 C.F.R. § 60-20.3(b) (1973).
19 Id.
20 Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1964).
21 See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), where the Supreme Court upheld
and accepted the EEOC's guidelines relating to employment testing.
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the test announced in Weeks v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co. 22 is
applied to the alleged discriminatory practice." In Weeks a claim of discrimina-
tion was made by a female employee when Southern Bell refused to consider
her for a switchman position. Southern Bell claimed that the discrimination was
based on a BFOQ in that women as a class could not perform the function of
a switchman. The court in rejecting Southern Bell's contention stated:
...[I]n order to rely on the bona fide occupational qualification exception
an employer has the burden of proving that he had reasonable cause to
believe, that is, a factual basis for believing, that all or substantially all women
would be unable to perform safely and efficiently the duties of the job
involved.24
This standard of "reasonable cause to believe that all or substantially all women
would be unable to perform safely and efficiently the duties of the job involved"
does not allow for stereotyped characterization of the abilities and effectiveness
of a class of individuals. To sustain a claim of a BFOQ, a factual basis must
be established. A defendant cannot use broad generalities or assumed charac-
teristics to support his contention. The court went on in Weeks to state:
We think it clear that the burden of proof must be on Southern Bell to
demonstrate that this position fits within the "'bona fide occupational quali-
fication" exception. The legislative history indicates that this exception was
intended to be narrowly construed.2 5
By placing the burden of proof on the employer, the court helps to effectuate
the narrow application of the BFOQ, as suggested by the EEOC and OFCC
guidelines, in that it increases the difficulty of providing a sufficiently compre-
hensive factual basis for the application of the BFOQ exception.
II. Decisions Relating to Title VII Protection of Pregnant Employees
Discrimination against pregnant employees has been manifest in four gen-
eral areas: hiring, fringe benefits, forced termination, and the right to a mater-
nity leave of absence. To determine the status of the rights of pregnant em-
ployees in these areas, it is necessary to examine court interpretation and accept-
ance of EEOC guidelines and Title VII language itself.
A. Hiring
It is clear that refusing to hire an individual because of sex is a violation
of Title VII unless that individual may be classified within a valid BFOQ. In
a complaint filed with the EEOC, the practice of refusing to consider married
22 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969).
23 See Cheatwood v. South Cent. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 303 F. Supp. 754, 757 (M.D. Ala.
1969); Kober v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 325 F. Supp. 467, 469 (W.D. Penn. 1971);
Ridinger v. General Motors Corp., 325 F. Supp. 1089, 1094 (S.D. Ohio 1971).
24 Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235 (5th Cir. 1969).
25 Id. at 232.
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women for employment due to the fact that married women frequently leave
a job because of pregnancy and family considerations was challenged.2" The
employer claimed that the discrimination qualified as a BFOQ because training
costs would make hiring a married woman unfeasible due to the high probability
of losing her on becoming pregnant. The EEOC, using Weeks language, stated:
Respondent has the burden of proving that it had reasonable cause to believe,
that is, a factual basis for believing, that all or substantially all women would
be unable to perform efficiently the duties of the job involved .... 27
The employer in this case failed to meet the burden and the possibility of preg-
nancy was held not to be a BFOQ for hiring discrimination. It would seem that
unless an employer could factually demonstrate pregnancy to be disabling to a
majority of women, pregnancy could not qualify as a BFOQ. s
B. Fringe Benefits
Under EEOC guidelines it is unlawful for an employer to discriminate
between men and women in regard to fringe benefits. 9 Maternity benefits for
wives of male employees cannot be greater than those given female employees."
Likewise, making insurance including maternity benefits available for male em-
ployees and their wives but only making it available for female employees if they
are heads of households violates Title VII5 1 Although arbitrators have tended
not to allow maternity leave as accumulated sick leave,32 the EEOC has found
the refusal to allow female employees to apply accrued sick leave for maternity
purposes, where there is no similar restriction on the use of male sick leave, to
26 CCH EEOC DEc. (1973) 6011 (1969).
27 Id. at 4031.
28 (1) The 'Commission will find that the following situations do not warrant the
application of the bona fide occupational qualification exception: (i) The refusal to
hire a woman because of her sex based on assumptions of the comparative employ-
ment characteristics of women in general. For example, the assumption that the
turnover rate among women is higher than among men.
(ii) The refusal to hire an individual based on stereotyped characterizations of the
sexes. Such stereotypes include, for example, that men are less capable of assembling
intricate equipment; that women are less capable of aggressive salesmanship. The
principle of non-discrimination requires individuals be considered on the basis of
individual capacities and not on the basis of any characteristics generally attributed
to the group.
(iii) The refusal to hire an individual because of the preferences of co-workers, the
employer, clients or customers except as covered specifically in subparagraph (2) of
this paragraph.
(2) Where it is necessary for the purpose of authenticity or genuineness, the Commis-
sion will consider sex to be a bona fide occupational qualification, e.g., an actor or
actress.
29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a) (1973).
29 29 C.F.R. § 1604.9 (1973).
(a) "Fringe benefits," as used herein, include medical, hospital, accident, life
insurance and retirement benefits; profit-sharing and bonus plans; leave; and other
terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.
(b) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate
between men and women with regard to fringe benefits.
30 CCH EEOC DEc. (1973) f 6197 (1970).
31 CCH EEOC DEc. (1973) 1l6110 (1970).
32 Sipser, Maternity Leave: Judicial and Arbitral Interpretation 1970-72, 24 LAB. L.J. 173,
188 (1973).
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be a violation of Title VII.' Subjecting pregnant and postpregnant women
to more stringent eligibility requirements for unemployment benefits than are
applied to other temporary disability situations is discriminatory. 4 Refusal to
credit a female employee for time spent on maternity leave in computing her
seniority is unlawful discrimination based on sex? The scope of the EEOC
guidelines seems to be all-encompassing in supporting the proposition that preg-
nancy is to be treated as a short-term disability, and discrimination against preg-
nant employees is barred in any aspect of fringe benefits unless it is so necessary
to the operation of the business as to justify its discriminatory impact on females.
C. Forced Termination
Forced termination of an employee due to a temporary disability such as
pregnancy is a violation of Title VII "if it has a disparate impact on employees
of one sex and is not justified by business necessity." 6 Such a violation occurs
where a school policy forces resignation or termination upon a teacher who is
pregnant and rehires her only in a substitute capacity while allowing leaves for
sickness and personal reasons. 7 An airline policy requiring resignation of flight
hostesses after becoming pregnant was found to be a violation unless the airline
alternatively offered a leave of absence except where the position could not be
left vacant or filled temporarily during the anticipated absence."' Similarly, in
another airline case involving permanent severance of a flight cabin employee
who became pregnant, the EEOC stated: "[t]hus Title VII requires any employ-
ment practice or policy which adversely affects females because of their pregnancy
be justified by business necessity."" In Doe v. Osteopathic Hospital Of Wichita,
Inc."' an unwed pregnant hospital office clerk was discharged. The court
determined that the discharge was due to the fact that the clerk was unwed and
pregnant and not "for cause" as claimed by the hospital.4" The court went on to
find a violation of Title VII in that a dismissal for pregnancy, even of an unwed
individual, "was not a bona fide occupational qualification by reason of being
reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the business of the Osteopathic
Hospital.""2 A female employee cannot be terminated for pregnancy nor can
she be subjected to a discriminatory reemployment policy unless such termina-
tion or discrimination can be justified by business necessity.
D. Right to Maternity Leave of Absence
In a 1969 decision 3 the EEOC reiterated its position on the granting of
33 OCH EEOC DEC. (1973) 1 6380 (1973).
34 2 CCH EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES GUmE 5051 (1972).
35 CCH EEOC DEC. (1973) 6204 (1970).
36 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(c) (1973).
37 2 CCH EMPLOYMENT PRACTicES GunE 5079 (1971); Id. 5112 (1972).
38 CCH EEOC DEC. (1973) 11 6226 (1971).
39 Id. 6268 at 4474 (1971); Accord, id. 6170 (1970).
40 333 F. Supp. 1357 (D. Kan. 1971).
41 Id. at 1360.
42 Id. at 1362.
43 CCH EEOC DEC. (1973) 6084 (1969).
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maternity leaves whether or not leaves are granted for illness." The granting of
maternity leave depending on the individual circumstances surrounding the in-
cident,45 conditioning leave upon two years of service while leave of absence or
disability leave is not so conditioned; 41 or limiting maternity leave to "married"
females, 4 discriminates against females in violation of Title VII. The failure td
rehire after a maternity leave is not necessarily discriminatory if there is an over-
riding need to fill the vacancy created by the leave as soon as possible.4"
An employer, to avoid a charge of discrimination, must offer a pregnant
employee a leave of absence and cannot refuse to rehire that employee unless
there is an overriding business necessity which cannot be met without discrimina-
tion.45
III. Decisions Relating to Constitutional Protection of Pregnant Employees
A. Cons$utional Challenges
Due to the fact that government employees,"0 and until recently, state em-
ployees and teachers,51 were exempt from Title VII protection, much of the fed-
eral legislation concerning discrimination against female employees has been
based on denial of due process or denial of equal protection of the law under the
fourteenth amendment. Nonetheless, many of the same criteria used in determin-
ing discrimination under Title VII have been employed by the courts. In Wil-
liams v. San Francisco Unified School Districe,52 the court granted injunctive
relief against the school district's mandatory maternity leave policy stating: "[t]he
District's maternity leave policy is neither rationally related to a legitimate ob-
jective nor promotes any compelling interest of the defendants."5 The standards
presented by this decision closely parallel the EEOC concept of barring discrim-
ination unless it is so necessary to the operation of business as to justify its dis-
criminatory impact on females.
Charges of discrimination based on lack of due process or denial of equal
protection have as a general rule not been as successful as charges brought under
44 The EEOC, in quoting from opinion letter of Nov. 15, 1966, stated:
The Commission policy with respect to pregnancy does not seek to compare an
employer's treatment of illness or injury with his treatment of maternity, since
maternity is a temporary disability unique to the female sex . . . .Accordingly, we
believe that to provide substantial equality of employment opportunity . . . there
must be special recognition for absences due to pregnancy . . . for this reason . . . a
leave of absence should be granted for pregnancy whether or not it is granted for
illness.
Id. at 4130.
45 Id.
46 Id. 6184 (1970).
47 Id.
48 McGaffney v. Southwest Miss. Gen. Hosp., 5 EPD 8409 (S.D. Miss. 1973).
49 CCH EEOC DEc. (1973) 6184 at 4313 (1970).
50 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1964), as amended 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e(b) (1972).
51 42 U.S.C. J§ 2000e(b), 2000e-1 (1964), as amended 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e(b),
2000e-1 (1972). In the 1972 amendment, states and political subdivisions thereof were deleted
from the exclusion of employers covered by Title VII. Also, educational institutions were
deleted from exemption of Title VII.
52 340 F. Supp. 438 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
53 Id. at 443.
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Title VII. Claims arising under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment are subject to two standards of review. Under the "permissive view,"
the challenger to the constitutionality of a classification must show that the
policy is arbitrary and does not have a "fair and substantial relation to the
object of the legislation." ' This places a burden of proof on the challenger that
is almost impossible to meet. The "strict scrutiny" test, however, places the
burden of proof on the Government which must show a "compelling state
interest" to sustain the constitutionality of the questioned regulation." This more
strict standard is applied whenever the classification is based on "suspect" criteria
or when it infringes on a fundamental right. Although the right to work is
important, policies limiting the type or scope of work available for a woman
cannot, in a constitutional sense, be seen as an infringement on a fundamental
right.5" In a recent decision" the Supreme Court found that a suspect classifica-
tion did not exist where "the class is not saddled with such disabilities, or sub-
jected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a
position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from
the majoritarian political process."5 " Applying this definition to discrimination in
employment based on sex, it is evident that sex is not a suspect classification.
Women are not relegated to such a position of political powerlessness nor are they
subjected to such unequal treatment as to command extraordinary protection.
Women are a viable force both politically and economically and do not require
the extra protection afforded members of a suspect classification.
In Struck v. Secretary Of Defense"5 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, in reference to the dismissal of a female Air Force officer due to preg-
nancy, held that "[a] relevant physical difference between males and females
justifies their separate classification for some purposes, and avoids the problem of
a denial of Equal Protection of the Law."6 The court based its finding on the fact
that "there is a compelling public interest in not having pregnant female soldiers
in the Military establishment."8 1 Clearly this kind of stereotyped reasoning has
been found invalid under EEOC guidelines. Every individual must be evaluated
as an individual" and not simply placed into a group, such as pregnant female
54 Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971).
55 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1968).
56 Recent Supreme Court decisions have indicated that the concept of a "fundamental"
right is limited to those rights mandated by the Constitution. In Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U. S.
56 (1972), the Court found that "the Constitution does not provide remedies for every social
and economic ill." Id. at 74. In San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1 (1973), the Supreme Court stated in regard to education:
It is not the province of the Court to create substantive constitutional rights in the
name of guaranteeing equal protection of the laws. Thus, the key to discovering
whether education is "fundamental" is not to be found in comparisons of the relative
societal significance of education as opposed to subsistence or housing .... Rather,
the answer lies in assessing whether there is a right to education explicitly or im-
plicitly guaranteed by the Constitution.
Id. at 33. Since there is no explicit or implicit right to work in the Constitution, the right to
work is not a "fundamental" right.
57 See San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
58 Id. at 28.
59 460 F.2d 1372 (9th Cir. 1971), remanded (to determine mootness) 409 U.S. 1071(1973).
60 Id. at 1375.
61 Id. at 1377.
62 See note 14, supra.
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soldiers, for easy classification. Although there may be a compelling public
interest due to individual physical characteristics in not having some pregnant
females in the military, there is no compelling public interest for a blanket ex-
clusion of all pregnant females from the military.
In Schattman v. Texas Employment Commission's the court upheld a policy
of forced termination for pregnancy in that it was "rationally related to a per-
missible state purpose." '64 The case was decided on a claim of denial of equal
protection after the court decided that the Texas Employment Commission was
excluded from Title VII coverage under § 2000e(b) (1) as a state agency."
Arguably, if the question had been decided under Title VII mandates, as the
dissent reasoned,66 the policy would have been found discriminatory as the agency
would have had to show an overriding business necessity justifying discrimination.
Such a necessity did not exist in this case.
It cannot be said that the equal protection clause is of no value in striking
down discriminatory classifications based on pregnancy, but the burden of proof
required by the permissive standard of review must be met. In light of this,
challenges of discriminatory policies will be more successful if brought under the
coverage of Title VII.6'
There are now pending before the Supreme Court two school cases involv-
ing forced maternity leave policies. The respective circuit courts of appeal have
reached different conclusions as to the constitutionality of the regulations. In
LaFleur v. Cleveland Board Of Education," the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
found a school policy requiring unpaid maternity leave to commence five months
before the expected due date to be unsupported by a valid state interest and
hence unconstitutional. In Cohen v. Chesterfield County School Board,9 the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the validity of a school policy requiring
maternity leave to commence at the end of the fifth month of pregnancy. The
court stated:
We conclude, first, that the regulation is not an invidious discrimination
based on sex. It does not apply to women in an area in which they may
compete with men. Secondly, school officials have a duty to provide, as best
they can, for continuity in the instruction of children and, to that end, they
have a legitimate interest in determining reasonable dates for the commence-
ment of maternity leaves and a right to fix them.70
The Supreme Court is thus faced with conflicting decisions from these circuit
courts. In Cohen a legitimate state interest in regulating maternity leaves was
found; in LaFleur no valid state interest was found. Although both are brought
63 459 F.2d 32 (5th Cir. 1972).
64 Id. at 41.
65 Id. at 38. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1) has subsequently been amended by 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 2000e(b) (1), ending the exclusion of state agencies from Title VII coverage. Therefore,
employees of the Texas Employment Commission are now protected from discrimination by
Title VII.
66 Id. at 41-42 (Wisdom, J., dissenting).
67 Landau, Sex Discrimination In Employment: A Survey Of State And Federal Remedies,
20 DRAXE L. REV. 417, 425 (1971).
68 465 F.2d 1184 (6th Cir. 1972), aff'd, 42 U.S.L.W. 4186 (U.S. Jan. 21, 1974).
69 474 F.2d 395 '(4th Cir. 1973), rev'd sub nom. Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 42 U.S.L.W.
4186 (U.S. Jan. 21, 1974).
70 Id. at 397.
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under a claim of denial of equal protection, 1 the Court, in deciding these cases,
will have difficulty in ignoring the applicable guidelines and will undoubtedly
find forced maternity leave policies to be discriminatory.
The establishment of a female employee's right to be free from discrimina-
tory employment policies can be most successfully maintained as a right afforded
by Title VII. Constitutional considerations, however, should not be ignored
and may provide an alternative route in pursuing remedial action to insure non-
discriminatory treatment.
B. Constitutionality of State Protective Statutes
With the enactment of Title VII there was a question as to how this federal
legislation would affect state protective statutes. It was uncertain whether Title
VII pre-empted state protective statutes or merely provided concurrent regulation
in this area. Initially, Title VII and state statutes stood together."' In 1969,
however, new guidelines were established which removed state protective laws
from the BFOQ exception."
EEOC guidelines expressly provide that state employment legislation limit-
ing female employment for certain periods of time before and after childbirth is
in conflict with Title VII and will not justify discrimination or qualify as a
BFOQ exception. 4 The supremacy of Title VII, as interpreted by the EEOC,
was sustained in Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co. 5 Although there are still dis-
criminatory laws on the books," it is certain that they will not survive consti-
tutional challenge.
71 Tide VII will not apply to these cases because until 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1) (1964)
was amended by 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e(b) (1) (1972), Boards of Education were excluded as a
state agency from Title VII coverage. Both of these cases were brought before the amendment
became effective.
72 When guidelines were first established by the EEOC, state laws inconsistent with the
guidelines were, in some instances, considered a BFOQ.(c) The Commission does not believe that Congress intended to disturb such laws
and regulations which are intended to, and have the effect of, protecting women
against exploitation and hazard. Accordingly, the Commission will consider limita-
tions or prohibitions imposed by such state laws or regulations as a basis for appli-
cation of the bona fide occupational qualification exception.
29 C.F.R. § 1604.1(c) (1966).
73 The Commission believes that such State laws and regulations, although originally
promulgated for the purpose of protecting females, have ceased to be relevant to our
technology or to the expanding role of the female worker in our economy. The
Commission has found that such laws and regulations do not take into account the
capacities, preferences, and abilities of individual females and tend to discriminate
rather than protect. Accordingly, the Commission has concluded that such laws and
regulations conflict with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and will not be
considered a defense to an otherwise established unlawful employment practice or as
a basis for the application of the bona fide occupational qualification exception.
29 C.F.R. § 1604.1(b) (2) (1970).
74 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1(b) (1) (1973).
75 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969); accord, Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Grabiec, 317 F. Supp.
1304 (S.D. Ill. 1970).
76 MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 149, § 55 (1966); N.Y. CONSOL. LAWS 30 Labor § 206(b)(1962); Mo. ANN. STAT. 15A § 290.060 (Vernon's 1965); PUERTO Rico ANN. LAws T. 29 §
467 (1969).
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IV. Conclusion '
Title VII and the ensuing EEOC guidelines make it clear that any written
or unwritten employment policy discriminating because of pregnancy is unlawful
unless an overriding business necessity can be factually substantiated. This ex-
ception has been very narrowly construed. Pregnancy must be treated as a short-
term disability, and an opportunity for a maternity leave must be afforded. It is
doubtful if any forced maternity leave policy will be upheld in the future.
Fringe benefits must be equitably applied to the maternity situation and cannot
favor nonmaternity-related events. State protective laws are no defense to a
charge of discrimination nor do they qualify as a BFOQ. Truly, the aim of this
legislation is to treat pregnant employees as individuals, and not place them into
a stereotyped class with alleged inferior capabilities against which discrimination
may be practiced.
Roger A. Bird
77 Since the time this article was originally written the Supreme Court has (as predicted
at p. 577, supra) held the mandatory maternity termination provisions of the Cleveland and
Chesterfield County maternity regulations to be violative of due process and thus affirmed
LaFleur v. Cleveland Board of Education (supra, note 68) and reversed Cohen v. Chesterfield
County School Board (supra, note 69). Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 42 U.S.L.W.
4186 (U.S. Jan. 21, 1974).
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